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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the denial of a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus of the Third Judicial District In and For Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On the 12th day of January, 1976, an Order to 
Show Cause as to why probation should not be terminated and a 
committment to the Salt Lake County Jail was issued. A 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by appellant and 
was properly denied by the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., 
District Judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek an affirmance of the lower court 
denial of appellants Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and a 
dismissal of the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant pleaded guilty to the crime of petty 
larceny in Salt Lake City Court on the 24th day of October, 1974. 
On that date he was sentenced to imprisonment for six months and 
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $150.00. The imposition 
of the jail sentence was stayed and appellant was placed on pro-
bation for one year. On August 27, 1975, the court ordered a 
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bench warrant to issue for the appellant based upon allegations 
of probation violation. On January 12, 1976, an Order to Show 
Cause was issued as to why probation should not be terminated 
and a committment issued. A hearing was held on January 27, 
1976, before the Honorable Robert C. Gibson, and it was determined 
that petitioner had violated his probation and he was ordered 
committed to the Salt Lake County Jail to serve the original 
sentence of six months. A Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed and 
the committment stayed until a final determination could be made 
regarding the issue now before this Honorable Court. 
POINT I 
WHERE THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
DEFINING MAXIMUM PROBATIONARY PERIODS, 
THE COURT IS PERMITTED TO EXERCISE 
DISCRETION AND PROVIDE A PROBATION THAT 
SERVES THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS 
CREATED - TO WIT, THE REFORMATION AND 
REHABILITATION OF A DEFENDANT. THE TRIAL 
COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN STATUTORILY -
PRESCRIBED DISCRETION IN PLACING PETITIONER-
APPELLANT ON PROBATION FOR 1 (ONE) YEAR WHEN 
THE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF INCARCERATION FOR THE 
SAME OFFENSE WAS 6 (SIX) MONTHS. 
The Utah State Legislature, in section 77-35-17, Utah 
Code Annotated, (1953), as amended, has enacted a probation statute 
that imposes no prescribed limitations of time for such probation 
and has clearly left such matters to the discretion of the court 
as seen below: 
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77-35-17 
Suspension of sentence - Probation-Conditions 
of probation - Power of Court to dismiss or dis-
charge defendant. Upon a plea of guilty or con-
viction of any crime or offense, if it appears 
compatible with the public interest, the Court 
having jurisdiction may suspend the imposition 
for such period of time as the court shall deter-
mine. 
The court may subsequently increase or decrease 
the probation period, and may revoke or modify 
any condition of probation. While on probation, 
the defendant may be required to pay, in one or 
several sums, any fine imposed at the time of 
being placed on probation. The defendant may 
also be required to make restitution or re-
paration to the aggrieved party or parties for 
the actual damages or losses caused by the offense 
to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or for 
which conviction was had. Further the defendant 
may be required to provide for the support of his 
wife or others for whose support he may be legally 
liable. Where it appears to the court from the 
report of the probation agent in charge of the 
defendant or otherwise, that the defendant had 
complied with the conditions of such probation, 
the court may if it be compatible with the public 
interest whether upon motion of the County Attorney 
or of its own motion, terminate the sentence or 
set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the 
defendant, and dismiss the action and discharge 
the defendant. Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended (Emphasis added) 
Throughout the statute, the Utah Legislature has 
provided the court with flexibility and discretion in the 
administration of the probation provision. The Court, by 
statute, is not only permitted to set the duration of probation, 
but also to modify any conditions of probation. 
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A period of probation under Utah law should not 
as a matter of law, be limited to the maximum jail sentence 
that can be imposed. Under Utah law, some jail sentences can-
not exceed 90 days, as for a Class C misdemeanor (Sec 76-3-204 
(3)) and a probationary period of such limited duration hardly 
serves any useful purpose. It is in misdemeanor type offenses 
where probation may be most appropriate rather than a jail 
sentence. But if the supervision of such a wrongdoer is to be 
limited to the maximum jail sentence that can be served, pro-
bation in such cases becomes a meaningless gesture. The 
court in such cases, when given the alternative of a short jail 
sentence or a short and thus, less meaningful probation period, 
may well impose more jail sentences in subsequent cases. How-
ever, a supervised probation, if available, may well steer a 
defendant away from further criminal activity and would certainly 
decrease the defendant's chances of incarceration. 
There is no clear delineation of case law in the 
United States. Nonetheless, the trend is decidely toward the 
more enlightened utilization of probation beyond maximum 
incarceration periods. In 1970, the Maryland Legislature enacted 
the following: 
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"Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the 
court having jurisdiction, may suspend the 
imposition or execution of sentence and place 
the defendant on probation upon such terms 
and conditions as the courts deem proper. 
The court may impose a sentence for a period 
and provide that a lesser period be served 
on confinement, suspend the remainder of the 
sentence and grant probation for a period 
longer than the sentence but not in excess of 
five years. 
Probation may be granted whether the offense 
is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. 
If the offense is punishable by both fine and 
imprisonment, the court may impose a fine and 
place the defendant on probation as to the 
imprisonment. Probation may be limited to one 
or more counts or indictments, but, in the 
absence of express limitation shall extend to 
the entire sentence and judgment. The court 
may revoke or modify any condition of probation 
or may reduce the period of probation.ff 
Code, Art. 27, §641A, 1 July 1970 (emphasis added) 
Probation is a program recognized in the law as 
a means of rehabilitation and guidance for the public offender. 
Recognizing this humane concept, most jurisdictions permit the 
probationary period to exceed the maximum possible sentence if 
the circumstances dictate and such to do so would be in the 
interests of justice. The legislature in Utah by enacting Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-35-17 has authorized the courts of 
this state to increase the period of probation originally fixed 
if it be in the public interest. 
Defendants in many cases, through plea negotiation, 
plead to a lesser included offense and frequently do such in the 
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belief that a plea to the lesser offense may likely result 
in consideration for probation. If courts are limited to a 
brief probation period, then judges are placed in the position 
of either denying the plea to a lesser included offense or 
utilizing jail sentences as the only reasonable sentence 
remaining open. Certainly, the public interest is better 
served when a probation is ordered where there exists a 
reasonable chance for rehabilitation than incarceration. 
Federal statutes (18 USC §3651) provide for an 
extended probation period and such as been supported by the 
United States Supreme Court in a line of cases, the principle 
of which is Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 23 L. Ed 2d 
162, 89 S. Ct 1503 (1969). (Citations of other cases are set 
forth in 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §1571 (4) Supplement) In Frank, 
Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall expressed the interpretation of 
the court of such statutes as follows: 
"Numerous federal and state statutory schemes 
allow significant periods to be imposed for 
otherwise petty offenses. For example, under 
federal law, most offenders may be placed on 
probation for up to five years in lieu of or, 
in certain cases in addition to a term of im-
prisonment. 
Therefore, the maximum penalty authorized in 
petty offense cases is not simply six months 
imprisonment and a $500.00 fine. A petty 
offender may be placed on probation for up to 
five years and if the terms or probation are 
violated, he may then be imprisoned for six 
months,11 Frank, supra, at 167. 
- 6 -
The American Bar Association has set forth similar 
guidelines in its Standards for Criminal Justice. 
"1.1 Nature of sentence to probation. 
(d) The court should specify at the time of 
sentencing the length of any term during which 
the defendant is to be supervised and during 
which the court will retain power to revoke the 
sentence for the violation of specified conditions. 
Neither supervision nor the power to revoke should 
be permitted to extend beyond a legislatively fix-
ed time, which should in no event exceed two years, 
for a misdemeanor or five years for a felony." 
Standards, p. 21 Probation 
The Committee's commentary adds the opinion that the 
limits on the length of a sentence to probation should be deter-
mined independently of the appropriate length of a prison sentence 
for the same offense and that a particular sentence to probation 
should be meted in consideration of the individual needs of the 
defendant. Standards p. 26 
The ABA Standards on Sentencing Alternatives and 
Procedures further reflects on the current trend in purpose of 
probation in stating that the basic objective of law and government 
is to provide an orderly alternative to the adjustment of con-
flicts through self-help. (It is noteworthy that the Utah Code is 
cited as an example of non-institutional sentencing provisions.) 
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"The second general principle, (regarding 
Probation) is that tne specific term thus lxed should be statutory limitation not 
be permitted to exceed five years in the 
case of a felony or two in trie case of a 
misdemeanor. The five year limit in felony 
cases is found in many current statutes. 
See e.g., Alaska Stat. §12.55.090 (c) (1962); 
Ark. Stat. Ann. §43-2331 (1965 Supp); Colo. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §39-16-6 (1) (1963); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. §775.14 (1965); Hawaii Rev. Laws 
§258.53 (1965 Supp.); 111. Ann. Stat. c. 38, 
§117-1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1964) (two year ex-
tension authorized); Kan. Gen Stat. Ann. §62-
2243 (1964) (five year extensions authorized; 
period cannot exceed authorized prison term) ; 
La. Code Crim. Proc. §893 (1967); Neb. Rev. 
Stat. §29-2219(1) (1964); N. E. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§504.1 (1955); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2A:168-1 
(1953); N. M. Stat. Ann. §40A-29-17 (1964); 
N. Y. Penal Law §65.00(3) (eff. Sept. 1, 1967); 
Ore. Rev. Stat. §137.510(1) (b) (1963); 18. U.S. 
C. 3651 (1964); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §7-315 (1957); 
The five year limit is also recommended by the 
Special Committee on Correctional Standards 
appointed to assist the President's Criminal 
Commission. See President's Comm'm Corrections, 
Appendix A, p. 207. 
"The limitation on the term for a misdemeanor is 
not so common, although it is found in at least 
four states and in the Model Penal Code, See Colo. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §39-16-6(1) (1963) (one year limit): 
La. Code Crim. Proc. §894 (1967); Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§28:1132 (1954); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-2219(1) (1964); 
Model Penal Code §301 2(1), Appendix B. infra. In 
addition to the reasons which are applicable to 
felonies, the limit for misdemeanor stems in part 
from the position taken in section 2.6 infra, that 
supposdedly ameliorative sentences should in general 
not exceed the time limits placed on the prison term 
authorized for the offense. Both this section and 
section 216(b) contain limited exceptions to~this 
eneral principle, authorizing two year sentences 
or misdemeanors while expecting that the typical 
jail term could not exceed one. In both cases, the 
exception is warranted in order to permit a sufficient 
length of time for rehabilitative programs to take hold.11 
Standards p. 71 (Emphasis added) 
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Another section of the Utah Code, §58-37-9 (10), 
which deals with penalties for possessing marijuana, among 
other things, provides that the court may place a defendant on 
probation upon "any reasonable terms and conditions as may be 
required.!f It is apparent, therefore, that the legislature 
intended to give the courts certain limited discretion in grant-
ing probation. The legislature has thus provided all-importajit 
flexibility in the administration of the humane perogative of 
probation. The court may set the duration of probation and 
modify any conditions thereof. This is consistant with the over-
all policy of the Utah Criminal Code as expressed in Utah Code 
Annotated §76-1-104 (as amended 1975): 
MThe provisions of this code shall be construed 
in accordance with these general principles:... 
(3) prescribe penalties...which permit recognition 
of difference in rehabilitation possibilities 
among individual offenders.11 (Emphasis added) 
Courts in Colorado, like Utah, may grant probation for 
whatever period as they deem best suited to the needs of the de-
fendant and consistent with the interests of society. (C.R.S. 
§16-11-202). Other states allow the trial court to set probation 
within some limit that has no relation to the possible incarceration 
period. In Nevada for example, probation may be extended for as 
long as five years (NRS 176.215). Hawaii, like Nevada places a 
five year limit on probation, even for misdemeanors (HRS, §711-77). 
Appellant cites Oklahoma as a state in which case law supports his 
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position. Note the date of Ex Parte Eaton, 29 Okla. Ct. App. 
275, 233 P781 (1925). Oklahoma in fact permits probation to 
extend up to two years (OSA 22 §991c) and such became law in 
1970 rendering Eaton impotent and without force. 
Some states have different probation period 
limitations depending on whether the defendant was convicted 
of a felony or a misdemeanor. Kansas specifies five years for 
felonies and two years for misdemeanors. Again, appellant cites 
Kansas as a supporting state. Note In re Carroll, 91 Kan. 395, 
137 P. 975 (1914). Carroll, however, is a 1914 case and has 
long since been overturned by legislative action. In Application 
of Young, 201 Kan. 140, 439 P. 2d 142 (1968), the Supreme Court of 
Kansas explains: 
11
 The parole authority of a police court was 
considered in Carroll. The statute then in 
effect (Laws of 1909, Chap. 116, Sec. 2) was 
examined and since it provided no limit on the 
term of a parole granted thereunder, this court 
held that a police court had no power to grant 
a parole for a term longer than the sentence 
imposed. . .The statute was amended in 1947. . 
under which a police court is specifically 
authorized to grant a parole for a term ex-
tending beyond the sentence. . . 
•k *k -k 
The language of K.S.A. 20-2312 is plain and 
unambiguous. . . .The statute supercedes any 
case law pertaining to the subject. (43P P.2d 
at 143, 145) 
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Furthermore, felony probation in Kansas may be later extended 
five additional years and misdemeanor probation may be extended 
an additional two years. The statute, however, goes on to pro-
vide that, in any case, felony probation can not be extended 
past the sentence limit (KSA 21-4611). Obviously, such is not 
true for misdemeanors. In Kansas, a misdemeanant may receive only 
a year's incarceration (KSA 21-4502). Therefore, in Kansas, a 
misdemeanant may be placed on probation for up to four years-
three years beyond the maximum possible incarceration! 
Appellant relies heavily on Idaho cases in his argument, 
particularly State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 452 P.2d 350 
(1969), and Ex Parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953). 
Respondents contend that neither case applies to the case before 
the court. In Idaho, although probation can be four times longer 
than imprisonment for a misdemeanor, the rule is different for 
felonies where probation is limited by the maximum period of 
incarceration. Both the Sandoval and Medley decisions involve 
felony convictions and not a misdemeanor conviction as in the 
instant case, and therefore, neither case can be considered as 
authority for appellant's position. The Idaho statute in fact, 
is similar to that in Kansas. A misdemeanant may be place on 
probation for up to two (2) years (IC 19-2601(7)), although the 
maximum sentence is six (6) months imprisonment (IC 18-113). 
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Again, note appellant's reliance upon the 1951f State v 
Eikelberger case for support. 
California extends probation well beyond most 
jurisdictions. In that state, a misdemeanant who could only 
be incarcerated for ninety (90) days may be place on probation 
for as long as three (3) years (California Penal Code, §1203a 
and People v. Heath, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968)). 
The state of Oregon directs that a defendant may not 
be placed on probation for less than one year (ORS 137.010). 
Among the fourteen (14) western states, only Arizona, New Mexico 
and Washington restrict probation by the maximum length of 
sentence (ARS 13-1657, NMSA 4 OA-29-19 and RCW 9.95.200). 
There are many policy reasons for allowing a trial 
judge the discretion to extend probation for a reasonable length 
of time even if it may be for longer than the maximum possible 
sentence. 
Probation is an attempt to give first offenders and 
some others a chance to demonstrate their capacity to overcome 
their errors. Another reason for sustaining extended (but not 
excessive) probation is to permit the trial judge the discretion 
to extend probation beyond a six month period in order to permit 
a defendant to meet other probationary conditions such as 
restitution, reparation, or fine. To fail to permit such would 
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be tantamount to requiring incarceration without any humane 
provision to consider individual circumstances. 
Respondents strongly urge this court to affirm 
the decision of the lower court. Appellant would seek to 
apply very rigid standards in an area that has a special need 
for discretion, A trial judge, at the time of sentencing and 
with the information available to effectively analyze the 
needs of the defendant and the best interests of society has 
the greater overview to evaluate the needs of an individual 
than has the legislature. The legislature recognized this and 
provided the statutory grounds to support the trial judge. The 
legislature unequivocally endowed the trial court with broad 
discretion which respondents ask this court to sustain. Appellant's 
authority for his position that probation should be limited by 
statutory sentencing provisions demonstrates the minority view. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, it may be seen that not only are the probation 
requirements a function of the sound discretion of the trial court 
but also, that the probation period may occasionally exceed the 
statutory sentencing requirement of incarceration. Support for 
such a position is found by majority in recent case law and 
represents the trend of the viewpoints of many jurisdictions 
throughout the United States and without a legislative prohibitive 
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to the contrary, such should be the position of Utah courts 
in light of 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
Respondents respectfully submits that the denial of appellants 
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus should be affirmed and this 
appeal denied. 
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